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I. Introduction 
Passions tend to run high in ethical debates 
concerning animals, not only among laypersons and in 
political arenas, but also in the nonnally cool chambers 
of academic philosophy. Objectivity and care, though 
indispensable for understanding differing positions and 
their supporting arguments, often seem in short supply. 
As a result, distinct issues are confused while 
arguments are misunderstood and then misrepresented 
in counterarguments. 
This essay concerns two normative concepts whose 
conflation in animal ethics debates easily leads to 
intellectual mischief: (1) equality in moral status, and 
(2) one's interests' having moral weight equal to the 
identical interests of others. (2), which is difficult to 
fonnulate precisely without awkwardness, might also 
be put in this way: one's interests' deserving equal 
consideration to the identical interests ofothers. After 
distinguishing and clarifying these concepts, I present 
a preliminary case for the thesis that animals are unequal 
in moral status-though their interests should be given 
equal consideration. In making my case I note some 
general implications for the use of nonhuman animals 
(hereafter, simply "animals") in research. 
Let me begin by presenting a couple of examples of 
the confusions to which I refer. First, in a widely read 
article, Katie McCabe, a journalist, makes a seemingly 
innocuous attribution: "Singer argues that all sentient 
beings have equal moral status "1 Once equal moral 
status and equal consideration are distinguished, given 
a general familiarity with Singer's work, it becomes 
clear that this attribution is false, or at least very 
uncertain-though Singer unequivocally argues for 
equal consideration. 
These words from philosopher Carl Cohen will serve 
as a starting point for disentangling these concepts 
(providing a second example): 
The first error [of animal activists] is the 
assumption, often explicitly defended, that all 
sentient animals have equal moral status·2 
Between a dog and a human being, according 
to this view, there is no moral difference; hence 
the pains suffered by dogs must be weighed no 
differently from the pains suffered by hwnans.3 
Here Cohen confud these two claims: (1) that two 
individuals, say a human and a chicken, have equal 
moral standing or status (to be defmed below), and (2) 
that an interest had by one being, say the interest a 
human has in avoiding suffering, has equal moral weight 
with the identical interest had by another being, e.g., 
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the chicken. Let us first elucidate the simpler notion of 
the equal consideration of interests. 
II. Equal Consideration or Identical Interests 
I begin with two premises that I will not defend in 
this essay: (1) some animals have interests,S and (2) 
their interests have some moral weight. Given this, we 
must consider whether identical interests count equally, 
i.e., whether they have equal moral weight. The 
principle of equal consideration of interests (''principle 
of equal consideration," for short) says that they do. 
Obviously, this issue is of the utmost importance for 
animal ethics. If the interest that, say, a cat has in X 
(where X is a particular object of an interest, e.g., 
freedom) does not have as much moral weight as the 
interest a human has in X, perhaps it has very little 
weight. If all animal interests had very little weight 
compared to the identical interests of humans, this 
would vindicate the ways animals have traditionally 
been regarded in our society. But if the principle of 
equal consideration is true (or otherwise worthy of 
acceptance), then, obviously, many of our animal-
exploiting institutions are morally unjustified. 
It has been argued by a number of philosophers, 
including Singer and Hare, that equal consideration is 
a formal requirement of morality or, in other words, 
that the concept of morality, or the logic of moral 
language, includes this requirement.6 This is almost 
certainly false. Would a putatively moral system that 
stipulated that the interests ofeveryone counted equally, 
except for Jesus', which counted twice as much as the 
others, for that reason fail to be a moral system? On 
the other hand, not counting identical interests equally 
seems in need of justification. It is appropriate to ask 
why so-and-so's interests should count more than those 
of others. If the interests one being has in X do not 
have the same moral weight as the interests another 
being has in X, there must be a morally relevant 
difference between them. 
This is a consequence of the principle of univer-
salizability. I assume a formulation of this principle 
that I think least contentious and clearly reasonable as 
a constraint on moral reasoning: If A judges that P in 
circumstances C, A must judge that P in relevantly 
similar circumstances (ones relevantly similar to C). 
This principle has the following implication: IfAjudges 
that the interests ofbeing B have weight W; A mustjudge 
that the interests ofbeings relevantly similar to B have 
W;7 Clearly a great deal of weight falls on what counts 
as "relevantly similar... Or-since another way to state 
the principle ofuniversalizability is to say that, for A to 
make two incompatible judgments in two different 
cases, the second case must bear a relevant difference 
from the frrst-the weight may be seen to fallon what 
counts as a "relevant difference." 
Therefore, while it cannotbe stated dogmatically that 
the concept of morality includes the requirement that 
all identical interests count equally (as Singer and Hare 
would have it), given the principle ofuniversalizability, 
the onus ofprooffalls on the inegalitarian,jor she must 
identify the relevant difference between the two beings 
that justifies making different moral judgments with 
respect to them. 
m. Equality of Moral Status 
Let us tum now to equal moral status, a somewhat 
vague but commonly employed notion. A and B have 
equal moral status, in the relevant sense, if and only if 
they deserve equal treatment-in a particular sense of 
IIequal" that is difficult to define butfairly easy to grasp 
through examples. First, let us elucidate equal treatment 
with an example. It might be said that dogs deserve dog 
food while cats deserve cat food. To give dogs and cats 
the food they deserve is to treat them unequally in one 
sense because it is to give them different kinds of food, 
but this is not the sense I am after. In the relevant sense, 
to give cats cat food and dogs dog food is to treat them 
equally because it is in their interests to be fed food 
appropriate for their species, and to feed them in this way 
is to affect the only interest at stake equally. It is 
compatible with the claim that dogs and cats have equal 
moral standing to judge that dogs deserve dog food and 
cats deserve cat food. It is not compatible with this claim 
to judge that dogs deserve dog food and cats deserve no 
food, for this judgment implies that the two creatures 
deserve unequal treatment (in the relevant sense). 
If two beings have equal moral status if and only if 
they deserve equal treatment, what is moral status itself? 
Moral status is the degree (relative to other beings) of 
moral resistance to having one's interest:r-especially 
one's most important interests--thwarted. Suppose that 
whenever it is morally imperative that either A or B 
die, suffer, endure a severe restriction of freedom, or 
have some other important interest thwarted, it is A 
whose interests, morally, should be thwarted. Then B 
has greater moral status than A, because the moral 
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resistance ofB 's most important interests against being 
thwarted, is greater than that of A's interests. The 
imaginary case of A and B would be a very clear 
example of one being's having greater moral status 
than another. 
But for two beings to differ in moral status, it need 
not be the case that one's interests always have stronger 
moral resistance to being thwarted than another's. I 
am convinced that actual differences in moral status 
are more subtle than that. But even if two beings' 
interests have equal moral resistance to being thwarted, 
except for one very important interest-with respect 
to which one's interest is always (or almost always) 
rightly sacrificed instead of the other's identical 
interest-it is correct to say that they differ in moral 
status (to that degree). 
The essential idea is simply this: If we consider a 
broad range of cases in which the important interests 
ofeitherA or B must (morally) be thwarted, and A loses 
out in some of these cases but B does not (or rarely 
does), then A is more sacrijiceable in an important 
sense-in this sense A has lower moral status. As an 
illustration, we tend to think that trout have lower moral 
status than humans; we tend to believe that there are 
cases in which it would be right to sacrifice interests 
(e.g., life, freedom, experiential welfare8) ofone rather 
than the other, and that it is usually or always the trout's 
interests that are rightly sacrificed. 
Iv. Equal Consideration and Unequal Moral Status 
I will now argue that, even if the principle of equal 
consideration is true, there is good reason to believe 
that animals differ in moral status. (A successful 
argument will, of course, show that the two concepts 
are distinct.) I begin with the assumption that there are 
no arguments that meet the onus of proof-established 
by the principle of universalizability-on the person 
who denies the principle of equal consideration. This 
assumption notwithstanding, I think an examination of 
interests shared by animals and humans suggests that 
humans have greater moral status than animals. 
(Assume from now on that by "humans" I mean normal 
adult humans.)9 
In my view animals (that have interests at all) share 
these three fundamental objects of interests with 
humans: {l) a favorable experiential welfarelo; (2) the 
freedom (lack of external constraints) necessary to do 
what they desire to do; and (3) life or remaining alive.ll 
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Let us look at these in tum to see if differences in moral 
status appear with respect to any of them. 
First. I believe that there are insufficient grounds 
for arguing that equal consideration of experiential 
welfare interests reveals differences in moral status. The 
picture is complicated. In the light of certain factors, 
equal consideration seems to favor, for example, 
performing painful experiments on a cat as opposed to 
a human (if either is to be used and the human does not 
volunteer): The suffering caused to humans who are 
terrified about being conscripted for the research, the 
humans' anticipatory dread if they are kidnapped, and 
so on-none of which a cat would experience. At the 
same time, other considerations seem to favor using a 
human. For example, the fact that an experiment will 
last only a few days and will not involve killing research 
subjects (if that is the case) can be explained to a human, 
not to a cat. so that a cat might suffer more fright during 
the research.12 In the light of such mixed considerations 
I am unprepared to assert that differences in moral status 
appear with respect to experiential welfare. 
However, I think that differences in moral status do 
begin to appear when we consider the interest of 
freedom. Because external constraints thwart an 
individual's freedom-interest by preventing her from 
doing what she wants, it may be said that they thwart 
this interest to the extent that they prevent her from 
doing what she wants. And this is a function of the 
range and nature of things an individual wants to do. 
The point is that, if, e.g., a dog and a human were kept 
captive for a number of days for the purposes of an 
experiment. no matter how humanely they were treated, 
such captivity would generally (not always) do more 
violence to a human's plans than it would to the totality 
of things the dog would want to dO.13 I ask the sceptical 
reader to consider all the things she wants to do in the 
next, say, five days and where she would have to go to 
do them. This gives us, generally, one reason-which, 
to my knowledge, has been overlooked until now-for 
preferring the use of animals over humans in (freedom-
restricting) research.14 
Differences in moral status appear most vividly, I 
think, with respect to life, but this is also the interest 
about which it is most difficult to say anything with 
certainty.IS A good way to start the analysis is to ask 
why death is a harm, or, equivalently, why life is 
valuable. People seem to use different language to 
describe the same intuitive idea. R. G. Frey holds that 
life is valuable because of its riches and that the value 
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of a given life is afunction ofits riches. For this reason 
he thinks that human life-which is characterized by 
deep personal relations, enjoyments of myriad kinds 
from hedonistic ones to the most refined, and 
autonomously pursuing lifeplans-simply overwhelms 
in value the life of an animal.16 Tom Regan argues that 
death is a harm because it forecloses all opportunities 
an individual has for obtaining the satisfactions 
available to members of one's species, and more 
opportunities are closed off in the case of a human than 
in the case ofa dog.1? I make essentially the same point 
as Frey and Regan by asserting that the death ofa human 
thwarts more interests, and more very important or 
centrai18 interests, than the death of an animal, so that 
the former is the greater harm.19 It really is difficult to 
believe that the painless killing of a human is not 
normally more destructive of something objectively 
valuable than the painless killing of an animal. This 
intuition persists, I think, even when we consider the 
fact that whatever a hamster's life involves is all the 
hamster has. 
If the preceding reflections are sound, differences 
in moral status appear with respect to life-interests. 
Applying the principle of equal consideration, it is 
worse, other things being equal, to kill a human than to 
kill an animal. That gives us one good reason to prefer 
the use of animals over humans in experiments that 
result in the research subject's death, ifsuch experiments 
are to be done at all. Thus, in freedom-restricting 
research that ends in the subject's death, there are two 
prima facie reasons to prefer the use of animals over 
humans: giving identical interests equal weight, a 
particular restriction of freedom is generally more 
harmful to humans than to nonhumans, while death is 
similarly a greater harm, in most cases, to humans than 
to nonhumans. If this is right, then animals are, after 
all, somewhat more sacrificeable than humans, though 
it may be that there are very few cases in which anyone's 
interests may justifiably be thwarted in research.2o In 
this light, we may acknowledge that there are 
differences in moral status between humans and 
nonhumans (and, no doubt, among different animals). 
The crucial point to recognize is that this thesis is 
perfectly compatible with the principle of equal 
consideration. 
As a concluding comment, those unsympathetic to 
the animal welfare movement had better get straight 
which thesis they are auaeking. If they are attacking 
the principle of equal consideration, they have a 
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substantial burden ofproof to meet; if they are attacking 
the thesis that all animals (that have interests) have equal 
moral status, their target is made of straw. If, like Cohen, 
they are attacking both theses simultaneously without 
distinguishing them, they are confused and are lowering 
the quality of animal ethics debates. 
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